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Beyond Pain—Controlling Suffering in  
Laboratory Animals
BERNARD E. ROLLIN
Although researchers have taken  steps to reduce the pain suffered 
by experimental animals over the past 
30 years, to reduce animal suffering 
more comprehensively, they must 
make a possibly harder change. They 
will have to abandon what has become 
the prevailing metaphysical outlook 
of science—the view that only what is 
reducible to physics and chemistry is 
ultimately real. This change does not 
necessitate abandoning reason. A well-
developed, common-sense metaphys-
ics first articulated over 2000 years ago 
by Aristotle can accommodate enlight-
ened science and a better understand-
ing of suffering.
Undoubtedly, we have learned a lot 
about pain in animals. In 1980, after my 
colleagues and I had drafted what was 
legally encoded as the 1985 amend-
ments to the Animal Welfare Act—
which, among other things, mandated 
pain control in laboratory animals—
we were asked by Congressman Henry 
Waxman to prove that there was a 
need for such a law. We did a literature 
search on “research animal analge-
sia” and found nothing except for one 
paper affirming that there ought to be 
papers and another affirming that very 
little was known (Rollin 2006a).
Also in that year, I was asked at 
a conference to respond to a pain 
researcher who claimed that the fact 
of differing electrochemical activity in 
the cerebral cortex of dogs from that 
of humans showed that dogs could 
not be said to feel pain in any sense we 
could understand. I pointed out to him 
that he did pain research on dogs and 
from that extrapolated the results to 
humans—so either his claim was false 
or his life’s work was!
This scientist was expressing com-
mitment to what I have called “the 
common sense of science” or “scien-
tific ideology,” a positivistic dogma 
affirming that everything legitimately 
part of science must be empirically 
verifiable, or reducible to physics and 
chemistry, and therefore talk of ethics 
or animal consciousness is scientifi-
cally meaningless—merely an expres-
sion of emotion and not something on 
which policy could be based (Rollin 
2006b).
Two years ago, I redid my litera-
ture search on pain control in animals 
and this time found 12,000 papers. 
Certainly, things are far better than 
they were. Physical pain, of the sort 
subject to control by analgesics, is 
no small thing. The pain-centered 
approach to animal ethics is laudable, 
but upon close examination, reveals 
itself to be difficult if not impossi-
ble to implement. For example, it is 
extremely difficult to see how one 
weighs emotional pain against physi-
cal pain. An animal can suffer from 
the threat of a beating as much as 
from an actual beating. How does one 
score the former in comparison to the 
latter? How does one score fear? How 
does one count the emotional pain of 
a cow whose baby is removed from 
her immediately upon birth when we 
know that, under normal extensive 
conditions, she will not wean the calf 
for 7 to 9 months?
Enter metaphysics—that is, the view 
of what reality is. Common sense finds 
that objects in the world are qualita-
tively different—beautiful and ugly, 
good and bad, green and yellow, hot 
and cold, living and nonliving, wet 
and dry. However, there are no words 
in physics and chemistry to describe 
the qualitative distinctions taken 
for granted in ordinary experience. 
The most articulate spokesperson 
of common-sense metaphysics was 
Aristotle, who saw reality as coexten-
sive with the world of our experience, 
something the scientific revolution 
explicitly denied.
Unlike much of modern  science, in 
which the laws of physics and chemis-
try explain all phenomena, in Aristotle’s 
world, each kind of thing obeyed its 
unique set of laws. For Aristotle, all 
things had a nature or unique func-
tion, which he called its telos—what 
it did. Living things were naturally 
explained by how they performed the 
functions of living things; sensation, 
locomotion, nutrition, reproduction—
all  living things are characterized by 
these functions but perform them in 
unique ways. A predator such as a tiger 
finds food and eats in a manner differ-
ent from a herbivore’s. A bird moves 
very differently from a snake. To know 
an animal is to know its telos, which 
we understand by observing numerous 
instances of the kind of creature it is. 
Therefore, we understand animals not 
by reducing what they do to the laws 
of  physics but by observing how they 
fulfill the functions of a living thing. 
This is in no way unscientific but in 
fact  augments the scope of science to 
cover what is essential to animal ethics 
and  common sense.
When we begin to think about ani-
mals in moral terms and about how 
we manage them, the most impor-
tant  criterion is to respect their 
telos. If we wish to assure animal 
well-being, respect for the animals’ 
telos is as important as—and prob-
ably more important than—avoiding 
physical pain. The pain of a surgical 
procedure can be rendered tolerable 
and minimized by the proper use of 
analgesics. But the suffering engen-
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methodology known as preference 
testing).
Replacing the notions of pleasure 
and pain with that of telos and the 
needs and interests flowing from it 
creates major benefits. It helps us to 
better understand our obligations to 
animals. It stops us from imposing 
harms as variegated as creating fear, 
striking an animal, causing illness, and 
engendering grief and loneliness on a 
single axis—pain. It also fits with com-
mon sense, which has no difficulty 
recognizing mental states in animals. 
Finally, it rationalizes talking of happi-
ness in animals, which means satisfy-
ing most (or all) of an animal’s needs 
and interests arising from its telos.
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well-being of research animals and are 
doing a good job controlling physical 
pain, the next step is to make sure 
the animals’ telos needs are respected 
in the way in which they are kept. 
Primates simply presented with food, 
surely a very basic need, will often not 
eat unless the food is randomly distrib-
uted in their cages, requiring foraging. 
Many animals will withstand pain and 
injury to escape severe confinement. 
These examples illustrate that things 
besides pain matter to animals; other 
situations may be worse than physical 
pain, and any telos violation creates a 
negative experience.
Furthermore, there is no simple 
word to express the many ways we 
can hurt animals besides causing them 
physical pain; the ways are as count-
less as possible telos violations. Positive 
mattering—the many states that matter 
to animals in a positive way—of course 
would include all states that are posi-
tive for the animal: freedom of move-
ment, pleasure, a sense of security, 
companionship, and play.
We are morally obligated to expand 
the scope of biological science so that 
it studies all of the ways things can 
matter in a positive or negative way 
to animal well-being. We also need 
to understand which forms of telos 
violation matter most to animals, and 
how. And we need to determine this 
without harming the animals (e.g., 
by letting animals choose between 
alternatives, which is a well-developed 
caged individually is not remedied by 
drugs. The  suffering resulting from 
the  separation of calf from cow at 
1 day of age is not alleviated by nar-
cotics. A clearer example is provided 
by coyotes and wolves that are caught 
in steel-jaw traps. These animals have 
been known to chew off their paws in 
order to escape. Because the physical 
pain of being held in a trap is far less 
horrendous than the pain of chewing 
off one’s limb, we must conclude that 
being kept immobilized is a far worse 
experience than very severe physical 
pain to the animal.
Ethologist Hal Markowitz and vet-
erinarian Scott Line (1990) tell of a zoo 
that built what was thought to be an 
exemplary enclosure for servals (South 
African bobcats). But the animals were 
severely depressed. They learned that, 
in nature, they ate by preying on low-
flying birds. At the zoo, their food 
was placed on the ground. They rec-
ommended that the zoo grind the 
horsemeat they were fed into balls. 
They further suggested that they use 
a compressed-air gun to deliver the 
rations, thereby accommodating the 
servals’ telos. The animals’ behavior 
changed immediately: They went from 
lethargic and depressed to active and 
engaged—and what we can presume 
is happy.
Marmosets will bond as pairs for 
life. Separating such a pair can often 
lead to the death of one of the part-






/bioscience/article-abstract/65/12/1113/223803 by guest on 16 Septem
ber 2019
